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Miller: Worker's Compensatoin - Exclusivity Provisions of the Worker's Co
WORKER'S COMPENSATION -Exclusivity Provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act as a Bar to Third-Party Actions Against Employers. Pan
American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Service, 586 P.2d 1220 (Wyo.
1978).

Maddux Well Service contracted with Pan American
Petroleum Corp. to service oil wells owned by Pan American.
On August 11, 1968, Maddux was engaged in workover services, pursuant to the master contract, on a well located in
the Beaver Creek Field, Fremont County, Wyoming. The
three-man Maddux crew used highly flammable petroleum
condensate, placed on the site by Pan American, to aid in the
rod-pulling procedure. During the operation, a fire broke out,
and flames engulfed the site. Howard Grouns, a Maddux employee working atop the derrick, was killed when he was
unable to escape, due to the lack of a Geronimo line, a
commonly-used escape device. Grouns was covered by Maddux's worker's compensation fund, under which his widow
and three children collected benefits.
Five months after the accident, Lynell Grouns, administratrix of her husband's estate, filed a wrongful death action
against Pan American, alleging negligence on the part of
Pan American, and requesting recovery of damages in the
amount of $751,500.00. Pan American then filed a thirdparty complaint against Maddux, claiming that Maddux
was liable.
Subsequent to the filing of the third-party complaint,
Pan American reached a settlement with the plaintiff, in the
amount of $72,000.00. Pan American sought, and was granted, leave to amend its complaint against Maddux, requesting recovery of the settlement sum, plus costs, attorneys' fees, and expenses incurred in the defense of the
primary action. The amended complaint alleged Maddux's
negligence, and, in addition, sought reimbursement under
theories of express and implied rights of indemnity and warranty, breach of contract, and joint tortfeasor contribution.
Maddux moved for summary judgment on the third-party
complaint, denying its liability under all theories set forth by
Pan American. The District Court granted Maddux's motion, its principal holding being that the exclusivity provisions of Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act barred all
third-party actions against a contributing employer.
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Pan American appealed the district court's decision,
reasserting its theories of recovery against Maddux as a
negligent employer. Pan American also alleged error in the
trial court's primary holding that the exclusivity provisions
of the worker's compensation act clothed the contributing
employer in impenetrable immunity from all third-party actions.
The Wyoming Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Rose, reversed the trial court's granting of the summary
judgment to Maddux. The Court held that the Wyoming
Worker's Compensation statute did not bar third-party
claims for indemnity, at least insofar as those claims were
based on express contractual obligations to indemnify.' The
majority's interpretation of the exclusivity provisions of
Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act raises questions
about the scope of a third party's right to recover against a
negligent employer who falls within the act, and of the
employer's potential liability beyond the statutorily-determined compensation award.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Raper argued that
the majority's opinion destroyed the very foundation upon
which the principles of worker's compensation are based
-the concept of definite but limited liability of the contributing employer-and abrogated the constitutional immunity from common-law suit granted to the employer by
the Wyoming Constitution.2 Justice Raper's dissenting opinion encompasses additional issues; the legislature's intent in
drafting the exclusivity clauses, and the nature and extent of
the immunity granted to the employer by those same provisions.
This Note will examine several areas of concern created
by this decision. First, the legislative intent behind Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act will be examined to
determine what relationships were meant to be governed,
and what rights and responsibilities were to be affected. Second, the court's interpretation of the applicable exclusiveliability provisions will be analyzed to ascertain whether
Copyright ©1979 by the University of Wyoming.
1. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Service, 586 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Wyo.
1978).
2. Id, at 1227 (dissenting opinion).
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that construction of the act circumvents the legislature's intent by destroying immunities granted to the employer, and
by giving to the employee an indirect method through which
he may obtain double recovery. Finally, in light of the
court's opinion, the circumstances will be set forth under
which a contributing employer might be held liable to a third
party seeking recovery.
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT

History and PhilosophicalBasis of Worker's Compensation
Modern worker's compensation legislation arose in
response to the need for an efficient system through which
an injured employee could obtain adequate financial relief.
Although at common law the employee could sue his employer for damages, recovery hinged upon proof of the employer's negligence in causing the injury.3 Not only was fault difficult to prove, but the employer could also raise the "unholy
trinity" of defenses: contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, and the fellow-servant rule.4
Worker's compensation acts have replaced the adversary contest of tort litigation, and the doubtful recovery
thereunder, with a legislative system designed to provide
automatic and rapid relief to the injured employee.' Under
this system, fault plays no part in the determination either
of the employer's liability or of the employee's right to
recovery,' nor can the employer enterpose the common-law
defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and
the fellow-servant rule.7 The new test of liability is the source
8
of the injury; that is, did it arise from the employment?
Recovery under worker's compensation acts thus is based
not on a philosophy of compensatory damages, nor upon actual need, but is statutorily determined upon the basis of
loss of earning power due to the disability, and upon presumptions as to amounts needed for adequate support.'
3.

PROSSER, TORTS § 80 (4th ed.
TION §§ 4.00 et seq (1978).

4.

PROSSER, supra note 3.
Note, Contributionand Indemnity: TheEffect of Workmen's CompensationActs, 42
VA. L. REV. 959, 961 (1956).
Fuhs v. Swenson, 58 Wyo. 293, 131 P.2d 333, 337 (1942).
PROSSER, supra note 3.
1 LARSON, supra note 3, at § 2.10.
Id. at §§ 2.40 and 3.30.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

1971); 1

LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
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The purpose of worker's compensation is to provide expeditious and certain relief to the injured employee, so that
he will not become a burden on society.10 The philosophical
basis of the legislation is that the cost of industry's human
accident losses should be borne not by the individual worker,
but by those for whose benefit he was employed when injured. Worker's compensation shifts the financial burden to
the employer who, in regarding his worker's compensation
premiums as a cost of doing business, raises his prices,
thereby transferring the loss to the consumer."
"In adopting the new system, both employees and
employers gave up something that they each might gain
something else."' 2 Employees relinquished their commonlaw right to sue the employer in tort, in exchange for
automatic benefits as statutorily prescribed. 3 Employers, in
turn, accepted absolute, but limited, liability and a commitment to make payments to the appropriate worker's compensation fund, for which they were granted immunity from
common-law suits brought by injured employees. 4
Wyoming worker's compensation legislation developed
along lines similar to those in other states. The first step
toward a comprehensive worker's compensation system was
taken in 1869, when the Territorial Legislature passed an
employers' liability act protecting railroad employees on the
job.'5 The state's first constitution also contained provisions
protecting the rights of workers,' 6 forbidding the passage of
any law limiting the amount of damages recoverable upon
the injury or death of any person,' 7 and providing for the
voiding of any contract waiving an employee's right to recover damages for injury or death. 8 It was further provided
that no contract could be entered into which required, as a
condition of employment, that the employee release the employer from liability for personal injuries received in the
course of the employment.'"
10.

Prigosin v. Industrial Conunission, 113 Ariz. 87, 546 P.2d 823, 825 (1976).

11.

PROSSER, supra note 3.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 989 (1918).
Morrisseau v. Legac, 123 Vt. 170, 181 A.2d 53, 57 (1962).
Seltzer v. Isaacson, 147 N.J. Super. 308, 371 A.2d 304, 307 (1977).
WYo. STAT. Ch. 97, 1 (1876).
WYO. CONST. art. I, 22.
WYo. CONST. art. X, § 4.
Id
WYo. CONST. art. XIX, § 7, Labor Contracts; Wyo. STAT. § 2522 (1899).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss2/10

4

Miller: Worker's Compensatoin - Exclusivity Provisions of the Worker's Co

1979

CASE NOTES

By 1913, a traditional worker's compensation system
was contemplated, but it was believed that such legislation
was forbidden by Section 4 of Article X of the state constitution, which read: "No law shall be enacted limiting the
amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or
death of any person. Any contract or agreement with any
employee waiving any right to recover damages for causing
the death or injury of any employee shall be void." 0 A later
amendment to this section" removed the constitutional
obstacles to passage of Wyoming's first Worker's Compensation Act in 1915.22
Soon after Wyoming's acceptance of worker's compensation, employers attacked the provisions as "wrong, unfair,
arbitrary, oppressive and a travesty on justice, in that they
required employers without fault to contribute to a fund to
pay for injuries to their employees. 21 3 Despite such vehement objections, however, the court, in the 1918 case of Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., upheld the worker's compensation laws as a constitutional, just and equitable way to
deal with the consequences of an industrial society.
The Scope of Worker's Compensation Legislation
The wording of Wyoming's Worker's Compensation
statute reflects the legislature's intention to govern the
rights and responsibilities of the employer and employee. 5
Section 27-78 of the Wyoming Statutes indicates that the
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

WYo. CONST. art. X, § 4.
WYO. CONST. art. X, § 4, amendment II.
"As to all extra hazardous employment, the legislature shall provide
by law for the accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of
which shall be paid compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each person injured in such employment or to the
dependent families of such as die as the result of such injuries, except in
case of injuries due solely to the sulpable negligence of the injured
employee. Such fund or funds shall be accumulated, paid into the state
treasury and maintained in such manner as may be provided by law. The
right of each employee to compensation from such fund shall be in lieu of
and shall take the place of any and all rights of action against any
employer contributing as required by law to such fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of any such injuries or death."
see also, Hotelling v. Fargo-Western Oil Co., 33 Wyo. 240, 238 P. 542, 543 (1925).
WYo. STAT. §§ 4315 - 4348 (1920).
Stephenson v. Mitchell, 569 P.2d 95, 98 (Wyo. 1977) at 991.
Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., supra note 12.
WYo. STAT. § 27-50 (1957).
"Compensation herein provided for shall be payable to persons injured... or the dependent families of such, as die, as the result of such injuries, . . The right of each employee to compensation from such funds
shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any and all rights of action
against any employer contributing, as- required by law to such fund in
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act is exclusive as to all other remedies and liabilities as between the employee and employer.2 6 Nor is legislative intent
difficult to ascertain as to the relationship of the employee
and third parties. The compensation system does not extend
immunity to a third party," and the employee has retained
his right to sue a third party whose negligence contributed
to the injury. 28 Double recovery of the compensation award
from the employer paid through the industrial accident fund,
and of damages from the third party is prevented by requiring that the industrial accident fund be reimbursed from any
such judgment recovery for the amount of the compensation
award made to the employee.2"
A major weakness of Wyoming's worker's compensation system as social legislation, is its failure to define unequivocally the relationship of third parties and employers
under the act. The typical situation is where a third party
pays a judgment award to an injured worker and then seeks
to recover against an allegedly negligent employer, either on
the basis of contribution or under theories of indemnity. The
issue in such cases is whether the exclusivity provisions of
the applicable worker's compensation legislation bar all

26.

favor of any such person or persons by reason of any such injury or
death."
WYo. STAT. § 27-51 (1957).
"The rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee on account of any injury shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies, at
common law or otherwise, of such employee, his personal or legal representatives or dependent family on account of such injury ....
WYO. STAT. § 27-78 (1957).
"Each employee, who shall be injured in any of the extra-hazardous
employments as herein defined, or the dependent family of any such injured workman, who may die as the result of such injuries, except in cases
of injuries due solely to the culpable negligence of such injured employee,
shall receive out of the industrial accident fund, compensation.., and such
right and payment shall be in lieu of and take the place of any and all
rights of action against any employer contributing as required by this act,
to the industrial accident fund in favor of any person or persons by reason
of such injuries or death."

27.

Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 1974); 2A LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 71.00 11976).

28.

WYo. STAT. § 27-54 (1957).
"Where an employee coming under the provisions of this act receives
an injury under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person
other than the employer topay damages in respect thereof, the employee
... shall not be deprived of any compensation which he would otherwise
receive under this act. He may also pursue his remedy at law against such
third person, except he shall not be entitled to a double recovery for those
injuries for which he has been paid compensation.... In the event that
such employee recovers from such third person, in any manner ... the proceeds of said recovery for those injuries for which he has been paid compensation under this act shall be divided as follows: the industrial accident
und shall be reimbursed ...for the total amount of all awards received by
the injured employer under this act.

29.

Id; Stephenson v. Mitchell, supra note 23, at 99, citing 2A LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 71.20 (1976).
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third-party actions against any employer covered by the act,
or, if not, under what circumstances an employer will be held
liable to such third party.3"
As was stated in the case of Ward v. Denver and
R.G.W.R. Co., decisions on this issue "are in hopeless conflict."3 That the controversy exists is not surprising, for
there are valid arguments supporting both absolute immunity for the employer under the exclusivity provisions, including immunity from third-party actions, and the thirdparty's right to recover against a negligent employer. Those
courts which have found that exclusivity provisions bar even
third-party actions against the employer, usually have based
their decisions upon two grounds. First, allowing third-party
suits against allegedly negligent employers would destroy
the central principle of worker's compensation, by reintroducing two concepts deliberately removed from the supposedly non-adversary system-fault and causation.32 Second, permitting third-party recovery against an employer
participating in the compulsory worker's compensation
system would allow the employee to do indirectly that which
he cannot do directly. That is, to sue the employer in tort
through the conduit of a third party, who is seeking recovery
of the amount paid to the employee as compensatory damages in 3the common-law action between the worker and third
party.
The cases holding that exclusive liability provisions do
not bar all third-party actions, are based upon notions of
equitable loss-allocation. 4 The theory is that to bar a third
party from seeking recovery against the employer is to impose upon that third party liability for all of the damages,
when in fact he might be liable only for part (under contribution theory) or none at all (under concepts of indemnity) 5
These decisions uniformly hold that third-party actions
against employers are not barred, since worker's compensa30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

2A LARSON, supra note 27, at § 76.10.
Ward v. Denver R.G.W.R. Co., 119 F. Supp. 112, 113 (D. Colo. 1954).
Note, New Policies Bearing on the Negligent Employer's Immunity from LossSharing, 29 MAINE L. REV. 243, 244-5 (1978).
2A LARSON, supra note 27, at § 76.52; Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair
Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E. 2d 768, 777 (1953).
Note, New Policies Nearing on the Negligent Employer's Immunity from LossSharing, supra note 32, at 248.
Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts,
supra note 5, at 959.
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tion statutes govern only the rights of employees and employers, and do not touch upon other relationships. 6 It is
reasoned that since third parties gained nothing by the
employer and employee compromises," worker's compensation laws should not be construed to abrogate third-parties'
common-law right to sue, in the absence of specific legislation so providing.
The latter position can be defended by the specific
language of most worker's compensation statutes, which
speak only to those in the status of employer and employee,
and do not refer to those outside that relationship. Even
those cases upholding the exclusivity provisions as a grant
of absolute immunity to the employer, explicitly recognize
the need for some remedy being afforded to a third party;
many decisions allow recovery against the employer when an
express contract to indemnify can be found. 9 Nevertheless,
the lack of explicit statutory definition in this area continues
to be a problem.
In deciding the issue of a third-party's right to recover
against an employer, most courts analyze the scope of the
employer's immunity under theories of contribution and indemnity. Contribution involves the sharing of the loss
among tortfeasors who are concurrently liable.4 Indemnity,
on the other hand, is grounded upon a contractual obligation, and the tortfeasor who shouldered the financial burden
seeks full reimbursement. 41 Broadly stated, the right of indemnity "is where one who is compelled to pay money which,
in justice, another ought to pay, the former may receive from
the latter the sums so paid. ' 42
The majority rule is that employers covered under the
worker's compensation laws may not be sued, either under
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. American Surety Co. of New York, 365 F.2d 412,
416 (10th Cir. 1966); American Surety Co. of New York v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Steel Company, 238 F. Supp. 850, 854 (D. Wyo. 1965); Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241
Minn. 349, 63 N.W. 2d 355, 365 J1954).
Carlson v. Smogard, 215 N.W.2d 615, 619 (Minn. 1974), citing Lunderberg v. Bierman, supra note 36.
Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, 118 N.W.2d 559, 565 (Iowa 1963); Markle v.
Williamson, supra note 27, at 623.
Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc. v. Rukert Terminals Corp., 65
A.2d 304, 308 (Md. 1949).
American District Telegraph Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 1950).
McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige S.A., 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463, 471
(1952).
DeShaw v. Johnson, 472 P.2d 298, 301 (Mont. 1970); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 96 (1937).
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contribution statutes or at common law, by a third party
seeking contribution."3 The rationale is simple, contribution
requires as its basic elements that there be two or more joint
tortfeasors who are commonly liable to the plaintiff, and
that one of them has been adjudged liable for or has discharged an unequal proportion of the common burden." In
order for the tortfeasors to share a "common liability," the
plaintiff must have a legally enforceable claim against both.
Under worker's compensation statutes,
the requisite common liability of the tortfeasors
would not exist. This is true because the plaintiff
employee could not sue his employer for actionable
negligence due to the exclusive remedy provisions
of the workmen's compensation act which bar an action at law for damages. While the plaintiff can sue
the defendant [third party] in tort, his only remedy
against the employer is under the applicable
workmen's compensation act, and thus the defendant and the employer are not commonly liable nor
is each guilty of actionable negligence toward the
plaintiff employee. 5
Unfortunately, decisions regarding the third-party's
right to recover under theories of indemnity are not so uniform. Common-law indemnity refers to an implied promise to
indemnify based not on any contractual relationship between the third party and the employer, but upon the parties'
relationship as concurrent tortfeasors. 6 Since this indemnity is based upon duties owed by the third party and employer, not to each other, but to the injured employee, it closely
resembles contribution, in that a common liability of the
tortfeasors to the plaintiff employee is required. As was
discussed above, the requisite common liability is absent
from the employee-employer-third party triangle, since the
employer cannot, under worker's compensation laws, be held
actionably negligent toward the employee. Therefore, as in
contribution, recovery by the third party on the basis of
common-law indemnity is usually denied.4 Such was the
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

2A LARSON, supra note 27, at §§ 76.10 and 76.21.
Comment, Wyoming ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors, 9 LAND AND WATER L.
REv. 589, 592 (1974).
Forney, Employer's Liability for Contributionor Indemnity, 34 INS. Co. J. 362, 363
(July 1967).
Id., at 364.
Id., at 365-6.
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case in Iowa Power and Light Co. v. Abild Construction Co.,

where recovery was denied under a theory of common-law indemnity, due to the lack of common liability., 8 The New Mexico court, in Royal Indemnity Co. v. Southern California
Petroleum Corp., likewise held that the worker's compensation statute had destroyed the right to recover against an
employer on the basis of common-law indemnity.4"
Express indemnity, unlike common-law indemnity, involves an explicit agreement in the contract for one party to
indemnify the other, irrespective of liability.5" When such
provisions are expressed in "clear and unequivocal" language,5 the majority of courts have held that the exclusiveliability provisions of the worker's compensation acts cannot
bar a claim for indemnity by the third party.2 Even those
courts that have upheld the employer's immunity have
agreed that worker's compensation acts do not prohibit the
employer from waiving his immunity by voluntarily and expressly contracting to indemnify a third party."3 By implication, these courts have acknowledged a third-party's right to
recover against an employer on the basis of express indemni54

ty.

The question becomes, therefore, not whether recovery
will be allowed under a theory of express indemnity, but
what constitutes an express contract of indemnification. The
New Mexico Supreme Court held that a contract provision
implying that the employer agreed to perform work without
negligence, did not constitute a contract of indemnity. 5 A
similar result was reached by the Supreme Court of Hawaii,
which held that a permit provision holding the employer
responsible for any damage to property or persons during
the course of its operations, did not create an express contract of indemnification.16 Other courts have held that im48.
49.
50.

Iowa Power and Light Co. v. Abild Construction Co., 144 N.W.2d 303 (Iowa 1966).
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Southern California Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.2d
358, 362 (1960).
Greenstone, Spreading the Loss-Indemnity, Contribution, Comparative Negli-

51.

gence and Subrogation, 13 FORUM 266, 269 (Fall 1977.
Id.

52.

Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts,

supra note 5, at 969.
Young v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 Wis.2d 36, 168 N.W.2d 112, 122 (1969);
Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc. v. Rukert Terminals Corp.,
supra note 39.
54. Id.
55. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Southern Calif~rnia Petroleum Corp., supra note 49, at 362.
56. Kamali v. Hawaiian Electric Co., 504 P.2d 861 (Hawaii 1972).
53.
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plied obligations to perform the job in a "workmanlike manner" neither constitute express agreements of indemnification,57 nor waive the employer's immunity from suit under
the worker's compensation acts.5"
Absent an express contract of indemnity, some courts
have allowed recovery under a theory of implied consensual
indemnity, usually referred to simply as implied indemnity.
Implied indemnity depends upon the existence of a special
legal relationship between the employer and the third party,
from which arise certain rights and duties, the breach of
which creates an implied obligation to indemnify.59 This
theory of indemnity, which involves a direct duty running
from the employer to the third party, should not be confused
with common-law indemnity in which the duty runs from the
employer and the third party, as tortfeasors, to the employee. Implied indemnity envisions a situation which
involves a contractual relationship between the
defendant [third party] and the employer under
which the employer has agreed to perform certain
work. When the employer fails to carry out his
undertaking properly and breaches [his duty], the
courts will imply an obligation upon the part of the
employer to indemnify the defendant for the damage proximately resulting from his breach of contract.6
Courts allowing recovery under implied indemnity have
justified their holdings under one of two theories. The statutes may be interpreted as barring only those claims which
are derivative of the employee's claim, and therefore not affecting the third-party's action, which arises not "on account
of" the injury to the workman, but from the breach of an independent duty owed by the employer to the third party.'
This was the holding in Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. PanAtlantic Steamship Corp.,62 which interpreted the following
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Desert Steel Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, County of Maricopa, 22 Ariz. App. 279, 526
P.2d 1077, 1079 (1974).
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Engineering Co., 230 Md.
584, 187 A.2d 864, 867 (1963).
Greenstone, supra note 50.
Forney, supra note 45, at 366.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc., 539 P.2d 1065,
1067 (Ore. 1975); Kamali v. Hawaiian Electric Co., supra note 56, at 865.
Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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subsection of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act:

The liability of an employer . . . shall be ex-

clusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever, to such employee, his personal representatives, husband, parents, dependents or next of
kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages at common law or otherwise on account of
such injury or death. 3
The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the provision
was "to make the statutory liability of an employer to contribute to its employee's compensation the exclusive liability
of such employer to its employee, or to anyone claiming
under or through such employee, or on account of his injury
or death arising out of that employment. "64 The Court
reasoned that the statute was not intended to preclude a
third party's right of recovery over against the employer,
since that right arose from the breach of an independent
duty owed to the third party, and not through the employee's claim. 6
Although the Ryan case applied admiralty law, its
holding has been the basis for courts adjudicating nonmarine cases as well. 66 Most courts have found the breach of

an independent duty to be a sufficient basis upon which to
allow implied indemnity. The Iowa court, for example, in the
case of Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, allowed a
claim for indemnity based upon the employer's breach of a
duty to perform the work safely and to protect his own employees. 7
The famous case of American District Telegraph Co. v.
Kittleson involved a suit by Armour's employee against
American.', The employee was injured when one of American's employees, working on the roof of Armour's plant, fell
through a skylight and landed on the plaintiff employee. The
skylight had become encrusted with dirt, and was indistinguishable from the solid portions of the roof. The court
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id at 128-199.
Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., supra note 62, at 129.
Id. at 129-132.
Forney, supra note 45, at 367.
Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, supra note 38.
American District Telegraph Co. v. Kittleson, supra note 40.
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allowed American's claim for indemnity, saying that Armour had breached a duty it owed to American to provide
the latter's employees a safe place to work."9
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. American Surety Co. of New
York, held that when a subcontractor breached his duty to
inspect the scaffolding upon which his employees worked,
and a resultant defect caused injury to an employee, the
prime contractor was entitled to indemnification for the loss
he sustained from a negligence suit brought by the injured
worker." Most recently, the Oregon Supreme Court found
the Oregon worker's compensation statute did not bar an action for indemnity "when the third-party plaintiff's liability
to the injured workman [had] resulted from the breach of an
independent duty, express or implied, owed by the employer
to the third-party plaintiff."'"
The key to these cases seems to be that the employer
performs, under contract, some service for the third party,
from which is implied an obligation to perform with due
care.12 Once such duty is found to exist, a further obligation
to indemnify the third party for damages resulting from the
breach is implied. "
A few courts have allowed indemnity not upon the finding of a breach of an independent duty arising from the contractual relationship between the employer and the third
party, but upon the equitable basis of loss-allocation according to fault.7" The philosophy behind these decisions is that if
the third-party indemnitee has become liable on purely vicarious grounds, the worker's compensation legislation should
not be held to bar his claim against the negligent employer.7 5
In summary, the majority of courts have held that the
legislative purpose underlying worker's compensation statutes was not to bar all third-party actions against employers, but to govern the employee-employer relationship and to
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 954.
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. American Surety Co. of New York, supra note
36.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc., supra note 61.
2A LARSON, supra note 27, at § 76.43(d).
Id.
Dale v. Whiteman, 388 Mich. 698, 202 N.W.2d 797, 800-1 (19721.

75.

2A LARSON, supra note 27, at § 76.43(d); PROSSER, supra note 3, at § 51.
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grant the employer immunity from personal injury suits
brought by the employee or those claiming through him.
Recovery in the form of contribution has been disallowed, on
the basis that worker's compensation precludes the
employer's liability to his employee in tort. Along the same
lines, recovery under the theory of common-law indemnity
has been held to be barred. Recovery under theories of express and implied indemnity has generally been allowed as
not destructive of the principles underlying worker's compensation.
THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
WYOMING'S WORKER'S COMPENSATION LEGISLATION

The principal holding of the trial court, and the basis
upon which the decision was appealed, was that the provisions of Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act barred all
rights of action against any employer, including third-party
claims for indemnity.16 In reversing the trial court's decision,
and in holding that worker's compensation provisions did
not bar third-party claims for indemnity, the Wyoming
Supreme Court raised further questions as to the extent of
an employer's liability to third parties."
The Court's analysis of the scope of the worker's compensation exclusivity provisions began with an examination
of parties barred from bringing suit against covered employers. The Court considered both statutory provisions and the
seemingly less-restrictive language of the Wyoming Constitution. 8
Section 27-50 of the Wyoming Statutes provided in relevant part that "compensation... shall be payable to persons
injured . . . or the dependent families of such, as die, as the
result of such injuries ....The right of each employee to compensation.., shall take the place of any and all rights of action ...in favor of any such person or persons by reason of
any such injury or death." [emphasis supplied by the
Court]79
76. Summary Judgment, Ninth Judicial District, Civil No. 14396, at 17.
77. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Service, supra note 1.
78. Id.
79. WYo. STAT. § 27-50, cited in Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Service,
supra note 1, at 1224.
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Section 27-51 of the Statutes, provided that
The rights and remedies provided in this act for
an employee on account of any injury shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies, at common
law or otherwise, of such employee, his personal or
legal representatives or dependent family on account of such injury; and the terms, conditions and
provisions of this act for the payment of compensation and the amount thereof for injuries sustained
or death resulting from such injuries shall be exclusive, compulsory and obligatory upon both employers and employees coming within the provisions
hereof.8 0
The applicable constitutional provisions of Article X,
Section 4, state that "The rights of each employee to compensation.., shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any
and all rights of action against any employer... in favor of
any person or persons by reason of such injuries or death."' '
In holding that the above-stated provisions did not bar a
third-party claim for indemnity, the Court followed the
Supreme Court's reasoning in the Ryan case, deciding that a
third-party claim arose not "by reason of" the employee's injury, but from "the breach of an independent duty owed by
the employer to the third party.' '82 The Court found the

employer-third party relationship to be beyond the explicit
language of the applicable provisions of the act. Therefore,
the third party could not be held to have relinquished any of
his rights, including the right to maintain a suit against the
employer.

83

The Court's language would seem to indicate that a
third party could bring a claim for relief under any of the
three theories of indemnity. The Court, however, limited its
holding to approval of third-party actions based on express
contractual indemnity, and declined to decide whether
causes of action based on contribution, implied indemnity, or
common-law indemnity could be brought.84
80.
81.

82.
83.
84.

WYO. STAT.

§ 27-51 (1957).

WYo. CONST. art. X, § 4.

Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Service, supra note 1.
2A LARSON, supra note 27, at § 76.52, cited in Pan American Petroleum Corp. v.
Maddux Well Service, supra note 1.
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Service, supra note 1.
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To the extent the Court held that claims based on express indemnity were not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act, the decision is
clearly in line with the majority rule. 5 The Court's reluctance to discuss alternate theories of third-party recovery,
however, leaves unanswered the extent of an employer's liability to such third parties.
As stated above, the court based its holding upon the
fact that the third party-employer relationship was beyond
the scope of Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act, and
that therefore the third party retained his right to sue for
breach of an independent duty. This language indicates approval of claims based on implied indemnity. Furthermore,
the court expressed dissatisfaction with the decision in
Shields v. Bechtel Power Corp., in which the federal district
court held that the "only justifiable way to abrogate the
Wyoming Worker's Compensation provision, and its exclusive remedy thereunder; is by the existence of a written
contract of indemnity against the employer.''86 The Wyo-

ming Supreme Court indicated that the dicta in Shields
allowing third-party claims only upon a theory of express indemnity was "overly narrow.

'8

Again, the court hints at ap-

proval of a third-party cause of action broader than that of
express indemnity alone. The court also stated that the lack
of any express contractual indemnity in the instant case
would not "affect the ability of Pan American to pursue its
implied-indemnity claims," 88 a clear indication that implied
indemnity rights exist under Wyoming's compensation law.
Despite such indications, however, the court declined to
discuss third-party actions based on implied indemnity, or
upon contribution, because such issues were not directly
before the court.89
While the issue of recovery based on contribution could
not have been an issue in the case-Wyoming did not recognize the right of contribution among joint tortfeasors until
1973, five years after the initiation of the primary action in
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts,
supra note 5.
Shields v. Bechtel Power Corp., 439 F. Supp. 192, 194 (D. Wyo. 1977).
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Service, supra note 1, at 1223.
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1224.
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is not so certain that the court could not have
this
discussed, at least in dicta, the right to recover under a
theory of implied indemnity. In granting Maddux's motion
for summary judgment, the trial court held that, absent the
exclusivity provisions of the worker's compensation act, Pan
American could have been entitled to prevail on the theory of
implied indemnity arising out of the contractual relationship
between Maddux and Pan American (i.e. based on a breach
of independent duty)." On appeal, however, Pan American
chose not to pursue its implied indemnity rights, but instead
alleged error in the trial court's finding that there was no express contractual basis from which Pan American could
raise its claim of express indemnification from Maddux 2
In discussing this issue, the court held only that Maddux's contractual obligation to perform in a "workmanlike
manner" was not a proper basis for finding an express contract of indemnity. 93 This is in conformity with the general
will not be construed
rule that such contractual obligations
94
indemnify.
to
agreements
express
as
The court should have determined, however, what would
be a proper basis upon which to ground a right of express
contractual indemnity. Given its language regarding a third
party's right to sue upon a breach of an independent duty,
the court also could have spoken to the issue of implied indemnity arising from a breach of such duty. While it is true
that Pan American did not pursue its implied indemnity
rights at the appellate level, the issue had nevertheless been
decided at the trial level, and was a proper subject for comment.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE COURT'S DECISION

Insofar as the court held that the exclusivity provisions
of the Worker's Compensation legislation did not bar a thirdparty action based on express indemnity, the decision was in
conformity with the majority rule. By limiting its discussion
to that one topic, however, the court missed an opportunity
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-7.3 to 1-7.6 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
Summary Judgment, supra note 76, at 9.
Brief for Appellant at 35.
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Service, supra note 1, at 1226.
Desert Steel Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, supra note 57.
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to give valuable guidance to lower courts, who in the future
will undoubtedly face cases brought under theories of implied indemnity rights to recover.
Despite Justice Raper's fears, as expressed in his dissenting opinion,"5 that the court's holding totally emasculated the worker's compensation system in Wyoming, the
majority's opinion in fact goes no further than the most conservative of courts, and merely brings Wyoming in line with
other jurisdictions in construing the exclusive-liability provisions of worker's compensation acts. By not unequivocally
stating the scope of its own ruling, however, the court did
leave open to debate the extent of an employer's liability to
third parties. That third-party actions based on express contractual indemnity will be allowed is clearly the holding, but
much beyond that remains in doubt.
With Wyoming's recognition, in 1973, of the right to
contribution among joint tortfeasors, the issue of a third
party's right to contribution against a covered employer is
sure to come before the court. Questions of implied and
common-law indemnity rights have yet to be answered.
The impact of this decision, however, may be greatly
lessened by the passage of a revised worker's compensation
act.96 The exclusive-liability provision of the revised legislation does not parallel the exclusivity sections of the 1957 act,
and the new statute will require interpretation apart from
any constructions given to previous acts. In light of the
reworded exclusive-liability section, the court may well have
to reconsider its holding in PanAmerican. At the very least,
questions left unanswered by this opinion will soon demand
response.
It is clear that the most expeditious solution to this
problem lies not with the courts, but with the Legislature. A
definitive worker's compensation act is needed, stating in
unequivocal terms what parties are governed by the legisla95.
96.

Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Service, supra note 1, at 1226-7.
Wvo. STAT. § 27-12-103(a) (1977).
"The rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee and his
dependents for injuries incurred in extra-hazardous employments are in
lieu of all other rights and remedies against any employer ... but do not
supersede any rights and remedies available to an employee and his
dependents against any other person."
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tion, and the extent of their rights and responsibilities
thereunder.
CONCLUSION

Worker's compensation legislation arose from a desire
to provide expeditious ad certain relief to injured employees, in exchange for an immunity from suit being granted to employers. The majority rule is that the exclusive
liability provisions of many worker's compensation acts do
not bar third-party claims against an allegedly negligent
employer. Claims based on express contractual indemnity
are usually allowed. The result as to actions based on implied
indemnity is less clear, but many courts find a right to relief
based on a breach of an independent duty owed by the employer to the third party. Contribution and common-law indemnity claims are universally disallowed.
The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Service clearly states

that the exclusivity provisions of Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act do not bar third-party claims based on express contractual indemnity. The Court did not rule on the
further issue of whether third-party actions based on implied
indemnity are statutorily precluded. The narrowness of this
decision leaves in doubt the extent of an employer's liability
to third parties under the act. The subsequent passage of a
new Worker's Compensation Act, as ambiguous as the old
law, means that the question undoubtedly will be relitigated.
SYLVIA LEE MILLER
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